The Voter and Catholic Morality
Voting and the "Abortion Touchstone"Recent times have seen the utilization of moral principles and Magesterial teaching by some bishops and Church leaders as instruments to validate and endorse the popular practice of voting for the "lesser of two evils" in an election. When presented with two candidates for office, both of whom, to a greater or lesser extent, have views on abortion contrary to Church teaching, the voter seems exhorted to compromise and even equivocate with himself in the matter - all in the interest of electing the candidate who will do the "least harm".
One of the approaches surrounds the application of John Paul II's encyclical Evangelium Vitae, Section 73, as a support mechanism for the moral liceity of voting for a nominally pro-abortion candidate -- if he is the "better" choice amongst the candidates presented. The encyclical has been represented by some to apply thusly: "If the less remote form of evil [i.e. a legislator voting for a 'more restrictive' pro-abortion bill] is clearly presented as licit and even sometimes necessary, then so, by implication, is the more remote form of evil [i.e. a voter casting his vote for a 'more restrictive' pro-abortion candidate]."
Herein we seek to explore whether, as is claimed by some of our Church leaders, the "more remote form" reasoning represents a truly licit and sound application of the moral judgement set forth by the Holy Father in Section 73. Further, we will endeavor to determine if the popularly-cited moral principle of "mediate material cooperation in evil for proportional cause" will apply to the voter/politician dynamic.
Our examination opens with a treatment of Evangelium Vitae, Section 73, in the present context.
Upon careful analysis of the text of the encyclical, it will be clear that a general application of the oft touted Section 73 "precedent" is presumptive, even when more narrowly applied to voting for legislation, as the text admits. This "precedent" (i.e. the moral judgement mentioned above) can be summarized thusly: a pro-life legislator can at times, and under certain conditions, vote for a bill with "more restrictive" abortion allowances. Very specific elements must be present for the "less remote form" (voting for a "more restrictive" pro-abortion bill) to be morally licit. It certainly does not give legislators the moral freedom to vote carte blanche for any and all "more restrictive" abortion bills.
Let's take a look at the elements necessary for Section 73 to apply, and then see if the "more remote form" (voting for a "more restrictive" pro-abortion candidate) can indeed be inferred from Section 73. It is always important in theological examination to firstly elucidate the text as it stands, and as a whole, before seeing if the text will admit of any "reading into."
Evangelium Vitae, Section 73, is recited as follows:
"Abortion and euthanasia are thus crimes which no human law can claim to legitimize. There is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead there is a grave and clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection. From the very beginnings of the Church, the apostolic preaching reminded Christians of their duty to obey legitimately constituted public authorities (cf. Rom 13:1-7; 1 Pet 2:13-14), but at the same time it firmly warned that 'we must obey God rather than men' (Acts 5:29). In the Old Testament, precisely in regard to threats against life, we find a significant example of resistance to the unjust command of those in authority. After Pharaoh ordered the killing of all newborn males, the Hebrew midwives refused. 'They did not do as the king of Egypt commanded them, but let the male children live' (Ex 1:17). But the ultimate reason for their action should be noted: 'the midwives feared God' (ibid.). It is precisely from obedience to God-to whom alone is due that fear which is acknowledgment of his absolute sovereignty-that the strength and the courage to resist unjust human laws are born. It is the strength and the courage of those prepared even to be imprisoned or put to the sword, in the certainty that this is what makes for 'the endurance and faith of the saints' (Rev 13:10).
"In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to 'take part in a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it'.
"A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of authorized abortions, in place of a more permissive law already passed or ready to be voted on. Such cases are not infrequent. It is a fact that while in some parts of the world there continue to be campaigns to introduce laws favouring abortion, often supported by powerful international organizations, in other nations-particularly those which have already experienced the bitter fruits of such permissive legislation-there are growing signs of a rethinking in this matter. In a case like the one just mentioned, when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects."
Even a cursory reading reveals that the entire context of Evangelium Vitae, Section 73 can be summarized in one short sentence: The morally licit response of citizens and legislators to an unjust law which represents an attack on life.
As shall hereunder be shown, the Holy Father's work in Section 73, paragraph 3, taken within the context of the entire section, is designed as a particular moral judgement about a specific action, and that very precise criteria must be fulfilled for this judgement to apply. Indeed, the Holy Father has set forward a specific scenario, introduced by language which clearly defines the sphere of the discussion - "A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where" (emphasis added) - before proceeding to list the elements necessary for the application of the particular moral judgement he is elucidating.
What are these elements? Since they each must be present for the moral judgement to apply to the case at hand, it behooves us as s cholars and reasonable men -- let alone faithful Catholics -- to have a firm grasp of their essence, implications, and construct before attempting an application of Section 73. This firm grasp will assist in eliminating any possible confusion and any erroneous attempt to apply Section 73 to "other possible actions that might seem at first sight identical or analogous." (Evangelium Vitae 73: The Catholic Lawmaker and the Problem of a Seriously Unjust Law; Angel Rodríguez Luño, Ordinary Professor of Moral Theology, Pontifical University of the Holy Cross; L'Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English; 18 September 2002; page 3)
Following are the necessary elements, with commentary by Professor Luño:
"a more permissive abortion law is already in effect or is being voted on;
"it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate the abortion law already in effect or being voted on;
"the absolute personal opposition to abortion on the part of the lawmaker is known to all, thus preventing any confusion or scandal;
"there is the intention not only to limit quantitatively the harm, but also to lessen the 'negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality'. This means that the effects of one's choices on the consciences of others, as well as on the collective conscience of a people, and thus the attitude or ideology expressed by the law, need to be taken into consideration;
"the lawmaker is in a situation in which his vote is determinative. Not to vote for the more restrictive measure given the number of voters and votes would imply supporting the more permissive law, making oneself responsible for its passage, since such support could easily be avoided. This condition is essential. If it is possible to repeal some elements of the prior law without participating in the final vote on the resulting text, such a final vote must be avoided. If the more permissive law will be overturned even though the lawmaker abstains, then he must abstain; if the permissive law will be overturned solely if he votes against it, then he must vote against it. If there is the complete certainty that the more permissive law will pass in any case, then he should vote against both proposals." (emphasis added) (ibid.)
The very precise language, the specific elements which must be present for the moral judgement to apply, and the entire context of Section 73 (the morally licit response of citizens and legislators to an unjust law), clarifies that Section 73 does not intend a general moral judgement, but rather offers a judgement on a specific action. In attempting a different application, the precise clarity is distorted, and subtle yet vital elements are lost.
Let's take, for instance, the situation one finds most often (mis)applied to Section 73, paragraph 3 - that of a citizen voting for a "more restrictive" pro-abortion candidate. At its root, this action is fundamentally different than the action described in Section 73 of a legislator voting for "more restrictive" pro-abortion legislation. Firstly, there is the intrinsic difference in the nature of what is being voted for in each action: one a human person, the other a document. Secondly, and by way of amplification, while the document is initially malleable, it becomes relatively fixed after the vote is cast. The candidate for office, however, being a human person of free will, is at liberty to act fluidly and ad hoc once he has been voted in -- his views are subject to change essentially at will (within his greater moral construct) - views which shall effect the decisions he makes as a legislator. The logical equation of the full, dynamic faculty of the human person with a document, under any conditions, is gravely aberrant. That such equation would be made in the setting of life issues is all the more disturbing.
Let's digress briefly at this point into an examination of the subject candidate.
If our politician is already compromised in his views at the point of election, a change may occur through grace (miraculous intervention, perhaps?) for the better; yet far too often pro-life voters have found themselves subjected to a legislator whom they rallied to elect, whose espoused views either changed for the worse once he was elected, or never saw action as far as his voting record.
Again, as it has been amply demonstrated over the course of the past three decades, candidates with generally unformed secular motives in this regard do not perform in a satisfactory manner in the handling of pro-life legislation once elected; having used the pro-life platform solely as a crude type of "branding" to gain votes and endorsements. This has been the rule, not the exception. Section 73 can indeed be taken as an exhortation of the faithful to elect only those candidates who fulfill the exigent requirement of impeccability in life issues:
"an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known"
Returning to our material discussion, it must be noted that, again, even within the context of the case examined in Section 73, it is clear that license is not given to a legislator to vote for or promote "more restrictive" legislation in every possible instance; but only if all the required elements are present in a situation. As is plainly evident from the Encyclical, such careless exercise of authority would indeed be morally wrong; as such action cannot serve to strengthen but only weaken a legislator's pro-life position and the cause he supports. For:
"In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to 'take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it'." (Section 73, paragraph 2)
>From this passage we clearly see that voting for or in any way supporting any law which permits abortion in any form is always a grave moral wrong - only excepting those cases in which the criteria explicitly set out in Section 73, paragraph 3 are fulfilled. This paragraph is quoted at length below, with the essential operative elements italicized:
"A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of authorized abortions, in place of a more permissive law already passed or ready to be voted on. In a case like the one just mentioned, when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects."
Here, paragraph 3 evidences substantial demarcation as being "purpose built" to address the delimited condition set forth in paragraph 2, above. Truly, one must ask the question: How often are the criteria of Section 73, paragraph 3 fulfilled when almost without exception our elected officials publicly hold that abortion is acceptable in certain instances?
In sum, Section 73, paragraph 3 has only a very specific application - to a legislator voting for legislation - and then only under precisely defined conditions. Further, and as detailed above, leveraging Section 73 to apply to the voter/candidate dynamic is to materially ignore the intrinsic difference in nature of what is being voted for in each separate instance: one a human person, the other a document -- and all that this substitution implies. Therefore, application of Section 73 to the voter/candidate dynamic is truly aberrant for the aforestated reasons; and does not follow from the licit application of any known moral principle or any sound theological exploration of the matter.
The discussion now leads us to yet another question: Why are our governments filled with morally compromised politicians in the first place? The answer is truly straightforward: Because voters have been repeatedly led (often by organizations and individuals who profess orthodoxy or an "uncompromising" pro-life stance) away from voting for candidates who publicly vow to protect life from conception to natural death; since such candidates are not considered "viable". This lesson has not been lost on the populace. Indeed, while 2003 California gubernatorial candidate Tom McClintock had a crucially less than perfect record of affirmatively delivering on all life issues, his subsequent discharge from the election serves as a sterling example of this now broadly-instilled and core "viability" mentality at work. Following such a line of reasoning, very few great, good, or noble accomplishments throughout human history would have even been started.
To exacerbate the problem, the faithful have been told by their bishops that voting for a pro-abortion candidate is sometimes morally licit:
"There are circumstances (as in an election between two pro-abortion candidates, one of whom is more extreme than the other) in which it is possible for a Catholic legitimately to vote for a pro-abortion candidate." (The Obligations of Catholics and the Rights of Unborn Children; 1990 pastoral statement; Bishop John J. Myers; Peoria, IL)
"However, when a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted if there are proportionate reasons." (Interim Reflections: Task Force on Catholic Bishops and Catholic Politicians; Cardinal McCarrick; Bishops' Spring Meeting; Denver; June 15, 2004; taken from the USCCB website)
However, mediate or "remote" material cooperation in evil being allowed for a proportionate reason is only applicable when other criteria are first met:
1. The action itself is determined to be indeed morally good or at least neutral.
2. The evil effect must be an incidental by-product and not a factor in the accomplishment of the good effect.
3. The evil effect must be only permitted or tolerated, not intended for itself; all bad will must be excluded.
Only if all the above criteria are met, may one apply the final criteria of having a proportionally grave reason for allowing the evil. "The presence of a proportional reason is not sufficient to allow what is called material cooperation." (Modern Catholic Dictionary; John A. Hardon, S.J.; definition for material cooperation)
In the case of voting for a political candidate who takes a compromised position on life matters, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the first three requirements are met. How are we to judge whether or not there is proportionate reason to allow the evil?
To begin, we must expand our scope of evaluation to take into account the evident results of such voting behavior (and such direction by our moral leaders) within the context of the now 30-plus year history of the issue. No moral principle is meant to be applied in the sterile vacuum of theory, devoid of pertinent practical example and experience.
Enter the immutable fact that respect for human life has seriously weakened, NOT strengthened in these past 30 plus years: Even those who are strong in their respect for life may be confused, such as those who (unknowingly, perhaps) use birth control with abortifacient action or openly advocate "morning after" abortifacient chemicals; yet claim to be strongly opposed to abortion itself. Surprisingly, even some professed pro-life physicians fill these ranks. Such a compromised state amongst individuals promoting the cause of life cannot be good for their souls, nor for the "soul" of society. And these "strong" ones are a very small minority among their fellow citizens. We have learned the lessons of compromise from our leaders (elected and Church) quite well, indeed.
Shocking evidence of this mentality of permissiveness and compromise can be found in the pews right next to us on the Sabbath. In a recent study by the Guttmacher Institute, it was shown that approximately one in four pregnancies end in surgical abortion; and, at 27%, Catholics procure over one in four of these surgical abortions themselves - just ahead of the general secular population. The broader attacks on life -- including pharmaceutical abortifacients, euthanasia, embryonic stem-cell research, cloning, certain fertility-enhancing procedures and chemicals -- are like a steamroller which has already killed untold scores; in addition to the well over 40 million (known) people slain through surgical abortion in this country alone. The machine is truly just getting ready for second gear; as, again, the above figure does not even begin to incorporate the insidious and rapidly-emerging evil of chemical abortion through many practices of abortifacient birth control. The implementation of RU-486 and the new family of "emergency contraceptive" morning after pills (Plan B, etc.) has effectively wiped out any and all modest incremental gains we may have made on the surgical abortion front in recent years. This is the "new dawn" of abortion, now being planned and progressively implemented by the abortion advocates and pharmaceutical companies.
In a nutshell, and when taken in this properly-formed context, the criteria of a proportionally grave reason to allow the evil is conclusively not met. Why is it not met? Quite simply, because the practice of electing compromised candidates over the decades in the interest of eliminating the evil of abortion has proven itself to be erroneous; an outright failure of protracted and hideous measure. By persistently espousing this approach, we, as Christians, have materially failed to meet abortion "special interest" with reciprocal civic and organizational opposition. Further, the ongoing promotion of compromised candidates has absolutely wreaked a havoc of confusion amongst the voting populace. Abortion advocates tolerate no compromise in the politicians they support. Why should Christians, who have a far greater cause (and who have recourse to the very Author of Life Himself), tolerate compromise amongst supposedly "pro-life" candidates?
Why, indeed, do we Christians act as if we are on the losing side of this battle for life, making compromises and concessions in our efforts to gain ground? Any saint could testify to the fact that following Christ without compromise brings about supreme victory; yet, almost without exception, the Christian community lives as if true fidelity will be the cause of our defeat. Let us recall the Holy Father's exhortation regarding obedience to God: "It is the strength and the courage of those prepared even to be imprisoned or put to the sword, in the certainty that this is what makes for 'the endurance and faith of the saints' (Rev 13:10)." (Evangelium Vitae, Section 73, paragraph 1)
Again: The electing of candidates who are publicly compromised on life issues has had the net collective effect of immersing us in the blood of over 40 million human persons across a span of thirty-plus years. This is vivid and unavoidable evidence of comprehensive failure at all levels of government to protect and defend life -- from conception to natural death. This is the government which we have elected ... one compromise at a time.
To summarize the examined matter:
· there is no explicit Magisterial teaching giving the moral "green light" to the faithful to vote for pro-abortion candidates: As has been demonstrated, Evangelium Vitae, Section 73, paragraph 3 has only a very specific application - to a legislator voting for legislation - and then only under precise conditions;
· the presently popular notion of "choosing the lesser evil" is simply invalid - one may NEVER licitly choose evil. As Pope Paul VI stated, "although it is true that it is at times lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater or in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it" (Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Humanae vitae [25 July 1968], n. 14);
· appealing to "proportional cause" to justify voting for pro-abortion candidates is erroneous; whatever good may have been gained from such a practice is far, far outweighed by the evil; not only the killing of the innocent, but the steady deterioration of the moral fabric of society - moral compromise does not build strength, it only spawns ever greater compromise; and
· given the above, the liceity of voting for pro-abortion candidates cannot be authoritatively affirmed by the application of those principles so often appealed to; therefore, the only certain, morally licit recourse is to the Fifth Commandment -- "You shall not kill."
Each year that passes in which we have not truly done all we can as Church and as members of the Body of Christ, is yet another year of incomprehensible loss and significant judgement upon us before God. Abortion "special interest" has been organized -- gaining ground and obliterating some of our strongest outposts -- for over 30 years. We have gone from a time in which virtually no surgical abortions occurred, to the present day which marks the death toll at over 40 million. More damning of us is the fact that three-quarters of all surgical abortions are procured by professed Christians of various denominations - one-third of that Roman Catholic.
Where is our leadership? Where have our bishops been throughout these decades of wholesale murder? How is it that abortion "special interest" can handily preside over the killing of 40 million -- for a period of 30 years -- without facing equal and opposite effort and organization from the Christian community, particularly Mother Church?
Have we learned anything yet?
Janet M. Thompson, MA Theology,
Franciscan University of Steubenville, '94
Rev. 1: Supplemental Section 73 text added July 28, 2004.
Final pre-pub edit for ProLife PAC on September 3, 2004.
Copyright 2004, Fides Foundation